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The Contribution of Social Transfers to the Reduction of Poverty
* 
 
We interpret social transfers broadly as a set of measures to reduce or relieve poverty, and 
study how well this purpose is served in the countries that participated in the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions in 2007. Motivated by the findings, we 
characterise a social transfer system in a country by its potential and effectiveness, and 
compare the countries for a range of definitions of the poverty threshold. The methods are 
also applied to two subpopulations of household types. 
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Poverty is an undesirable feature of every society, and its alleviation is regarded as an
important function of the government and related institutions. In this paper, we study
how well the social transfers ful¯l this role. The ideal is that if all social transfers
were discarded there would be an appreciable level of poverty, but when the social
transfers are regarded as a component of household income, poverty is greatly reduced.
We assess how close a system of social transfers is to such an ideal. We analyze
the (cross-sectional) data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Condition (EU-SILC) from 2007 to evaluate the consequences of the social transfers
on the poverty status of individuals and on the change in the poverty gap of those who
would be classi¯ed as poor if all social transfers were withheld.
Large di®erences prevail among the countries of the European Union in social pro-
tection expenditure as a percentage of GDP; Eurostat (2009). In 2006, social protection
expenditure as a percentage of GDP was above 30% in France (31.1%), Sweden (30.7%)
and Belgium (30.1%), and below 15% in Latvia (12.2%), Estonia (12.4%), Lithuania
(13.2%) and Romania (14.0%). These disparities re°ect di®erences in living standards,
but are also indicative of the diversity of the social protection systems and of the demo-
graphic, economic, social and institutional structures speci¯c to each country. There
are many policies that national governments can institute to reduce poverty. The Lis-
bon Summit in 2000 gives directives to the member states to invest in people and build
an e®ective welfare system to reduce the high poverty rates across Europe. Poverty
reduction and income distribution are not the only purposes of social transfers systems,
as argued by Atkinson (1995). Child and disability bene¯ts and tax allowances are also
part of the social transfer system, but their role is not solely to reduce poverty.
Comparing the e®ectiveness in alleviating poverty is not easy, because some coun-
tries spend more on social protection than others and countries use di®erent instru-
ments. Eurostat (2010) concludes that the impact of social bene¯ts in the mid-2000's
was weakest in Bulgaria and several Mediterranean Member States (Greece, Spain,
Italy and Cyprus). In contrast, more than half of those at risk of poverty in Hungary,
Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Denmark were removed from this risk as a result of social
transfers. The results of our study are largely in agreement with these conclusions.
2Eurostat (2010) ¯nds that social transfers had a signi¯cant impact on reducing the
risk of poverty among children (under the age of 18). They removed 39.4% of children
from the risk of poverty in the EU27 in 2007, more that for all the age groups (34.6%).
Social transfers had a relatively important impact on children in Cyprus, Germany and
Estonia, where the proportion of children taken out of risk was at least ten percent
higher than the corresponding share for the whole population. In the Netherlands,
Bulgaria, Portugal, Lithuania, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Belgium, the proportion of persons removed from the risk of poverty as a result of
social transfers was higher across the whole population than it was for children.
Research on how the income distribution is changed as a result of social transfers is
less common. Until the seminal contribution by Esping-Andersen (1990), most empir-
ical work on distributive impacts of welfare programmes had relied on comparing the
amount of social security expenditure with its distributive outcomes. The reduction
of poverty by social assistance payments is assessed by several measures, such as the
headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, FGT2 (Squared Poverty Gap Index) and the Sen
index of poverty.
HÄ olsch and Kraus (2004) investigated the relationship between the degree of cen-
tralization and the distributive outcomes of social assistance schemes in European
countries. They classify the schemes in the EU15 countries according to features re-
lated to centralization, and identify ¯ve groups or systems. Their results provide some
evidence that extremely centralized systems are more e®ective with regard to redis-
tribution of income than extremely decentralized schemes. They point out that for
systems with a medium degree of centralization, the hypothesis that greater decentral-
ization leads to more e®ectiveness is not supported. A commonly adopted approach to
measuring e±ciency, due to Beckerman (1979a, b), is based on the aggregate poverty
gap, de¯ned as the sum of the individual income shortfalls from the poverty line. A
system is called e®ective if the aggregate poverty gap is greatly reduced by the social
transfers.
Di®erent studies address the performance of the social protection systems of the
European Union countries in reducing poverty both in relative and absolute terms.
Morissens and Sainsbury (2002) analyze the incidence of poverty and poverty reduc-
tion for the entire population and vulnerable groups. They assess the e®ectiveness
3of social transfers by comparing the population's economic situation before and after
taxes and transfers, and use relative and absolute measures of poverty reduction. They
conclude that during the 1990s the poverty rate increased in most countries and in
many instances for vulnerable groups in particular, with the exception of the elderly.
They also ¯nd large di®erences in how the social protection systems of the countries
reduce poverty both in relative and absolute terms. The relative e®ectiveness of many
countries decreased during the decade.
The role of social transfers in Europe is discussed also by Cohen-Solal et al., (1999),
Marlier et al., (1999) and Eardley et al. (1996). Atkinson (2000) shows that the Eu-
ropean countries that reduce poverty most tend to have higher social spending. Many
studies relate the country's system to its method of administration, share of GDP, and
the like. The EU-SILC database contains information about disposable income after
and before the social transfers, with or without the pension bene¯ts (variables HY020,
HY022 and HY023), so it is well suited for such studies.
We de¯ne the potential of a (national) social transfer system by comparing its
total (or average) amount with the total (or average) shortfall of household income,
commonly referred to as the poverty gap. In agreement with Beckerman (1979a, b), we
de¯ne e®ectiveness of the system as the fraction of the total amount of social transfers
that resulted in the reduction of the poverty gap.
The next section describes the amounts involved in the social transfers in the 26
countries that participated in the cross-sectional component of EU-SILC in 2007 and
summarizes their impact by the percentages of households that would be classi¯ed
as poor or not poor di®erently, depending on whether social transfers are discarded
or retained as a component of household income. The following section studies the
impact of the social transfers on the poverty gap. Section 4 de¯nes and evaluates the
potential and e®ectiveness of the national social transfer systems. Section 5 applies
these methods to two subpopulations that are associated with greater need for social
transfers: single-parent households and households with many children.
The poverty threshold is conventionally set at 60% of the national median equiv-
alized household income (eHI). We respond to the concern about the poor foundation
or arbitrariness of the setting of this percentage by evaluating all quantities related to
poverty for a range of threshold percentages. We present the results in the form of
4graphs, in which the poverty rate, the poverty gap and similar quantities are repre-
sented by curves, functions of the poverty threshold percentage.
Throughout, per-capita values indicate (weighted) sample averages for an equival-
ized unit of a household. We use the OECD-modi¯ed scale (Hagenaars, de Vos and
Zaidi, 1994), according to which the equivalized size of a household is determined by
counting one of its adult members (e.g., the head) as a unit, every other adult as 0.5,
and every child (member up to 14 years of age) as 0.3. For example, the equivalized
size of a household with two adults and two children is 1:0 + 0:5 + 2 £ 0:3 = 2:1. A
social transfer of 10500 Euro to such a household amounts to 10500=2:1 = 5000 Euro
per equivalized unit. In our analysis, we regard pensions and survivor's bene¯ts as
elements of social transfer.
2 The extent of social transfers
In this section, we summarize the country's social transfer system by estimating the
percentage of households that receive social transfers, the percentage of individuals in
these households, the average size of a transfer per individual and its size relative to
the country's median eHI. These summaries are displayed in Table 1. The table shows
that a majority of the households and individuals receive some social transfers in most
countries; the exceptions are Greece and Spain, and Poland by a narrow margin, and
only for the number of households. At the other extreme, 91.2% of individuals in
Ireland receive social transfers. The estimated percentage of individuals who receive
social transfers is greater than the percentage of households in all countries, by between
3.1% (Greece) and 14.5% (Germany). The social transfers are most generous in Ireland
and Norway, where they exceed 10000 Euro per capita, and they fall short of 1000 Euro
in most eastern European countries and Greece. It might seem more equitable to relate
the amount of social transfers per capita to the median eHI or a similar quantity. By
this measure, the social transfers are on average most modest in Greece, where they
constitute only 8.3% of the median eHI. Hungary (48.9%) and Ireland (47.7%) have
the most generous social transfers, reaching nearly half the level of the median income.
It is plausible that some social transfers are not distinguished from wages in some
countries. For example, various allowances, such as for children and disability, are
5Table 1: Summaries of the social transfers in the countries in EU-SILC in 2007.
Sample %rec. soc. transfers Average
Country H-holds Indiv-s H-holds Indiv-s Euro % medHI
AT Austria 16684 53706 63.44 76.90 6016.41 32.98
BE Belgium 15493 49135 66.96 80.06 6531.93 37.19
CY Cyprus 10630 40082 73.85 82.38 3237.48 20.25
CZ Czech Republic 23059 69875 63.54 72.70 1483.76 27.38
DE Germany 31709 89641 60.83 75.34 5000.16 28.31
DK Denmark 14887 47567 77.84 86.70 6497.93 27.84
EE Estonia 14372 51562 66.16 79.05 991.20 22.29
ES Spain 34586 118364 30.15 33.43 1475.20 12.38
GR Greece 14793 48809 27.49 30.57 833.17 8.33
IT Italy 52772 166776 51.36 58.15 2002.83 13.35
FI Finland 27454 91784 73.79 84.59 6622.05 35.41
FR France 25907 83301 62.80 74.10 5906.95 35.66
HU Hungary 22297 73831 71.28 81.677 1924.40 48.90
IE Ireland 13691 45235 86.50 91.20 10558.70 47.67
IS Iceland 8651 31809 63.13 71.31 5076.30 17.68
LT Lithuania 12777 41749 58.05 66.77 755.28 23.05
LU Luxembourg 10419 35337 66.77 79.42 8529.41 28.54
LV Latvia 11209 37587 70.69 80.69 809.96 24.98
NL the Netherlands 25905 83159 68.28 80.44 3469.76 19.06
NO Norway 15132 48926 77.34 87.01 10253.51 35.65
PL Poland 42852 166050 48.85 58.15 930.79 26.58
PT Portugal 11691 39265 60.52 69.10 1447.80 19.15
SE Sweden 18126 58076 72.02 83.08 7088.57 38.21
SI Slovenia 28570 111478 75.62 83.81 3573.14 35.19
SK Slovakia 14858 57638 69.26 79.93 959.83 24.74
UK United Kingdom 21942 66824 59.13 71.66 6162.07 29.41
6Table 2: Example of a summary of poverty status before and after social transfers.
The ¯gures are in percentages, based on a ¯ctitious data.
After
Before Poor Not poor
Poor 4.5 6.8
Not poor 1.2 87.5
clearly recognized when paid directly to the recipients, but may be disregarded when
they are credited in the form of higher threshold for income that is not taxed. With
the large number of countries studied, it is beyond the scope of this paper to account
for these di®erences in the national tax systems. (The local taxation would also have
to be taken into account.) A similar issue arises when we consider the `alternative
world' in which no social transfers are distributed. In this setting, the tax liabilities of
a household are also changed, and so, at least in principle, part of a bene¯t (payment)
received in the `real world' should be set aside for additional taxes. However, in the
alternative world the tax revenue authority would adjust the tax rules to re°ect the
reduced income of the country's households. In brief, the rules for taxation cannot be
regarded as ¯xed, and we do not venture to second-guess how they would be altered
in a hypothetical setting. See Duncan et al. (1993) for a related discussion.
We assume that the purpose of a social transfer system is to distribute funds in a
targeted fashion, so that, ideally, their recipients would have been poor, or classi¯ed as
poor, if they did not receive them, but after receiving them would not be classi¯ed as
poor, or their eHI would be much closer to the poverty threshold. Therefore, we classify
each household and individual according to two poverty-related criteria: without social
transfers and with them. This classi¯cation is summarized by a 2£2 table of estimates
of national percentages (rates); see Table 2 for an example. We use the code 0 for being
poor and 1 for being not poor, and combine these codes for the poverty status before
and after social transfers.
We are particularly interested in the o®-diagonal entries (6.8% and 1.2% in Table
2), which correspond to switching from being poor without counting social transfers
7to being not poor after counting them (pattern 01), and switching from being not
poor without counting social transfers to being poor after counting them (pattern 10).
Pattern 10 is plausible because the poverty threshold is increased when some households
contribute to its evaluation with income boosted by social transfers. We denote by r01
and r10 the rates that correspond to the respective patterns 01 and 10, and by r00 and
r11 the proportions of individuals who are respectively poor and not poor according to
both criteria.
A prerequisite for Table 2 is a method of classifying households as poor or not
poor. We adopt the established criterion according to which a household, and every
one of its members, is classi¯ed as poor if their eHI is smaller than a given percentage
of the national median eHI (Hagenaars and van Praag, 1985). Instead of the (single)
conventional setting of 60%, we estimate the rates of the two `switch' patterns for a
¯ne grid of threshold percentages in the range 40{80%, acknowledging that although
the threshold of 60% is reasonable, other thresholds could also be considered. Thus,
we represent the (national) rates of switching by curves, functions of the threshold
percentage. These curves are plotted in Figure 1. In the left-hand panels the estimates
of the rates of switching from poverty (r01) and switching to poverty (r10) and in the
right-hand panels the corresponding relative rates, r01=(r01 + r00) and r10=(r10 + r11),
are drawn. The denominators, r01+r00 and r10+r11, are the respective rates of poverty
and its complement, both evaluated without counting the social transfers. They are
the constituencies for which the two kinds of switches are possible.
The absolute rates of switching from poverty (100r01%) are highly unstable and
they intersect a great deal even at threshold percentages close to 60%, so they are
highly sensitive to the setting of this percentage. Although Greece, Italy and Spain
have the lowest rates of switching throughout the range of threshold percentages, the
rates for several other countries change a great deal in relation to the other countries.
For example, Ireland has the highest rate for the lowest threshold percentages, but its
rate for the highest percentages is well below the average for the studied countries.
The rates for Norway and Sweden are around the average for the smallest threshold
percentages, but are among the highest for the threshold near 80%.
The relative rates of switching from poverty, 100r01=(r01 +r00)%, take into account
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Figure 1: The estimated national rates of switching from and to poverty as a result of
social transfers in 2007; poverty threshold percentages 40{80%.
9stability. The countries' curves tend to decrease with the threshold percentage because
more extreme poverty (corresponding to lower threshold) is in general easier to identify
or target. Just like for the absolute rates, Greece, Italy and Spain have the lowest
relative rates of switching from poverty throughout the range of poverty thresholds.
Apart from them, we can identify another group of countries with relative rates in the
range 40{60% for the poverty threshold of 40% (Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), and the remaining countries (the entire north-west
Europe, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) have distinctly higher relative rates
for small poverty thresholds. For higher poverty thresholds, these groups of countries
are not separated as clearly but, with only a few exceptions, maintain their ranks. For
example, the rate for Slovakia is slightly higher than for Belgium and Luxembourg for
the poverty threshold of 80%.
The rates of switching to poverty (bottom panels of Figure 1) are extremely unsta-
ble, because they involve operations with relatively small percentages, especially for
low poverty thresholds. The relative rates, 100r10=(r10 + r11)%, di®er from the abso-
lute rates only slightly, because r11 is close to 1.0 for all threshold percentages and
all countries. In general, the percentages of switching to poverty, both absolute and
relative, are much smaller than for switching from poverty. Most households classi¯ed
as not poor do not rely on social transfers to maintain their prosperity vis-µ a-vis any
reasonable poverty threshold.
3 Reduction of the poverty gap
An arguably more re¯ned measure of the impact of social transfers is obtained by
comparing the poverty gap based on income with the social transfers ignored and
the poverty gap based on income with the transfers included. The poverty gap of
a household is de¯ned as zero if the household's eHI exceeds the poverty threshold;
otherwise it is equal to the di®erence of the poverty threshold and the household's eHI:
PG = (PT ¡ eHI)+ :
We consider the same range of threshold percentages, 40{80, as in the previous section.
The mean poverty gap of a country is then represented by a curve, a function of this
percentage. This mean (average) is referred to as the absolute mean poverty gap, to
10distinguish it from the relative mean poverty gap, which is de¯ned as the ratio of the
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Figure 2: The estimated reductions of the poverty gap that are attributable to the
social transfers.
The poverty gap can be evaluated for the income before and after social transfers.
The di®erence (reduction) can be attributed to social transfers. This reduction can
be evaluated on the absolute and relative scales; the former is the plain di®erence,
and the latter is this di®erence divided by the poverty gap before social transfers.
The reduction on these two scales is plotted in Figure 2 for the 26 countries in EU-
SILC in 2007. The reduction on the absolute scale is closely related to the per capita
amount of transfers. Ireland has the highest mean reduction, but it is followed by
Norway, which has the second highest amount of transfers per capita (see Table 1),
only for the threshold percentages near 80. United Kingdom takes the second place
for all threshold percentages except in the vicinity of 80%, even though its per capita
11amount of transfers is much smaller than for Norway or Ireland. Countries with much
smaller per capita amounts of transfers have much smaller reductions; with small overall
amount of transfers only small reductions can be attained. For example, even though
the per capita amount of social transfers in Hungary is nearly 50% of the median eHI,
the absolute reduction of the poverty gap is much smaller, 100{200 Euro, than for the
countries with much greater median eHI (and much greater absolute poverty gaps).
In contrast, high level of social transfers need not result in a substantial reduction of
poverty; this happens when a lot of the funds are received by households that would be
classi¯ed as not poor even if social transfers were not counted. For example, Austria
has a higher per-capita amount of social transfers than Germany (6020 Euro versus
5000 Euro). However, the transfers reduce the poverty gap much more in Germany
than in Austria for all threshold percentages. Of course, if the poverty gap in a country
were low, then it would be very di±cult to reduce it, and there would be an upper
limit on the amount of reduction. The levels of poverty gap and are much higher than
the reduction attained in both countries, but the mean poverty gap in Austria is much
lower than in Germany, especially for small thresholds. This provides a rationale to
study the relative reduction of the poverty gap, de¯ned as the ratio of the (absolute)
reduction and the mean poverty gap.
The right-hand panel of Figure 2 displays the relative reductions of the poverty gap.
On the absolute scale, the reduction increases with the threshold percentage, because
so does the mean poverty gap. On the relative scale, the reduction decreases because
the social transfers tend to be more e®ective at reducing more extreme poverty. The
ranking of the countries closely resembles the ranking according to the relative rates
of switching from poverty in the top right-hand panel of Figure 1. Greece, Italy and
Spain stand out with the lowest relative reductions, followed by the set of six countries
that can be identi¯ed more clearly in Figure 1, with the exception of Cyprus for the
lower threshold percentages, for which its relative reduction exceeds that of Germany,
Iceland, the Netherlands and Norway. Czech Republic and Hungary have among the
highest relative reductions, for what might appear to be a relatively small outlay on
social transfers; they are small in absolute terms but, especially for Hungary, are large
in relation to the national median eHI. Although the relative reduction for Austria
12is uniformly greater than for Germany, the di®erence is less pronounced than on the
absolute scale.
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Figure 3: The potential and the e®ectiveness of the social transfers in the countries in
EU-SILC.
We interpret the social transfers as a means of poverty reduction, and reduction
of the poverty gap in particular. Therefore, we de¯ne the potential of a system of
social transfers as the ratio of the total amount of social transfers and the overall
poverty gap calculated with the social transfers ignored. This is equal to the ratio of
the corresponding per-capita amounts. As the poverty gap is de¯ned with respect to a
poverty threshold, we de¯ne the potential for the range of threshold percentages 40{
80. In these ratios, the numerator (social transfers) is constant, and the denominator
13(poverty gap) increases with the threshold percentage. Therefore the potential is a
decreasing function of the threshold percentage.
The estimated national potentials are plotted in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.
The potentials, as functions or curves, intersect a great deal, quite a lot even in the
vicinity of the conventional threshold of 60%. A straightforward comparison of the
countries based on a single percentage is therefore ill-advised. For example, Cyprus
has the highest potential for the lowest threshold percentages, but its potential for the
highest percentages is only around the average. However, Greece, Italy and Spain,
identi¯ed earlier as the countries with the lowest amounts of transfers per capita, have
the lowest potential, except for United Kingdom, which has the second lowest potential
for the threshold percentages close to 40%.
For the poverty threshold set at 40% of eHI, the potential exceeds 100% for all
the countries. Thus, if allocated with purpose, the social transfers in these countries
could easily raise every household's eHI, that is, its national minimum, above 40%
of the median eHI. The social transfers in Norway, Sweden and Slovenia could raise
the minimum to a level even above 80% of the median eHI. Note however, that the
social transfers raise the level of the median eHI, and therefore create `new' poverty,
comprising those classi¯ed as not poor if all social transfers were withheld and as poor
when all social transfers are taken into account. We can characterize the social transfers
in a country by the poverty threshold for which the amount of transfers is equal to the
poverty gap. This critical threshold percentage is found as the threshold percentage
at which the potential is equal to 100%, that is, where the potential curve crosses the
horizontal dashed line drawn in Figure 3. The critical threshold percentage is lowest
for Greece (46.1%), followed by Spain (52.9%) and Italy (55.4%); it is equal to 80.4%
for Slovenia, and to 82.9% for both Norway and Sweden.
The e®ectiveness of the social transfers is de¯ned as the ratio of the reduction of the
mean poverty gap and the amount of transfers per capita. The curves corresponding
to the range of threshold percentages 40{80% are plotted in the right-hand panel of
Figure 3. The curves are plotted on the logarithmic scale. Most of the curves increase
throughout the range of threshold percentages, rapidly for small threshold percentages,
because for higher threshold percentage more transfers are likely to be received by
those below the poverty threshold. However, there are some anomalies at the highest
14threshold percentages, for Spain and Latvia in particular, and the curve is °at in the
vicinity of the 80% threshold for several other countries.
The social transfer system in United Kingdom is uniformly the most e®ective, fol-
lowed by Ireland for almost the entire range of threshold percentages and Czech Re-
public for a narrow range around 80%. The lowest e®ectiveness is attained by Italy for
the threshold percentages up to just above 70%, for Cyprus up to 60%, and for Latvia
and Spain for threshold percentages above 70%.
A system with a low potential might be expected to be highly e®ective because a
relatively smaller amount of funds is easier to monitor and target at the most deserving
cases. For example, the transfers in United Kingdom have a low potential and high
e®ectiveness, and Cyprus has high potential and low e®ectiveness. However, there are
several exceptions to this inverse relationship. For example, Italy and Spain have both
low potentials and low e®ectiveness and Czech Republic has an above-average potential
and high e®ectiveness.
Figure 4 presents an alternative summary of the potential and e®ectiveness of the
national social transfer systems. Each country is represented by a curve of its e®ec-
tiveness as a function of the potential. The vertical ticks mark the values for the
thresholds of 80, 70, 60, 50 and 40% (from left to right). The countries are divided into
four groups, and the curves for the countries for each group are drawn by solid lines
against the background of the curves for the other countries drawn by thin dashes.
To facilitate comparisons across the groups, the axes in the four panels have identical
scales.
For any given value of the potential, the social transfers in the countries in the
north and west of Europe are more e®ective than in the south and in the three former
Soviet republics. The systems in the countries in central Europe are about as e®ective
as the systems in the Scandinavian countries, but have a smaller potential. Except for
Cyprus, the systems in the southern European (Mediterranean) countries have a low
potential, and all of them have low e®ectiveness.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: The association of potential and e®ectiveness of the social transfers in the
countries in EU-SILC.
165 Social transfers to vulnerable subpopulations
The summaries of the social transfers are well de¯ned in subpopulations of households,
and are of particular interest in subpopulations that may be targeted for support or
are generally acknowledged as being appropriate recipients of speci¯c income-support
programmes. In EU-SILC, we can identify two such subpopulations, single-parent
households and households with three or more children. In fact, the former category
is de¯ned as single-adult households with at least one child, but we assume that the
adult is (in the role of) a parent. In the analysis of such a subpopulation in a country,
we use the same de¯nition of the poverty threshold as in the earlier section, based on
the entire sample of households. We focus on the changes in the mean poverty gap that
can be attributed to social transfers. The rates of switching between poverty states
are not suitable summaries because they are very unstable functions of the threshold
percentage.
The left-hand panel of Figure 5 compares the mean poverty gaps in the subpopula-
tion of single-parent households and the entire population of a country. Each country
is represented by a curve drawn for the poverty gaps de¯ned at the poverty thresholds
ranging from 40% to 80%. The symbol for each country is placed at the coordinates
for the national and subgroup mean poverty gaps at 40%. All the curves are increasing
and they tend to converge near the top right-hand corner of the diagram. The ends of
the curves are uneven, because the countries have di®erent mean poverty gaps at the
threshold of 80%. The thin dashes mark the identity line; a curve above the identity
indicates that the mean poverty gap of the single-parent households exceeds the over-
all mean poverty gap in the country. With the sole exception of Denmark, the mean
poverty gap for single-parent households is higher than the mean poverty gap for the
all the households. Even for Denmark, single-parent households have higher poverty
gap from about 61% threshold on, but its levels are lower than for other countries with
similar poverty gaps for all households.
The right-hand panel compares the mean amounts of social transfer for all and
single-parent households. The countries' symbols have sizes proportional to the square
root of the percentage of the households led by a single parent; these percentages range
from 1.8% for Greece, followed by Slovenia (2.1%) and Spain and Portugal (2.2% each),
































































































































































Figure 5: The mean poverty gap and the mean amount of social transfers paid to
single-parent and all households.
to 7.1% for Belgium, preceded by the UK (6.8%) and Ireland (6.7%). The symbol for
Denmark is omitted from the plot, because it would be completely obscured by the
much bigger symbol for Belgium. The sample proportion of single-parent households
in Denmark is 3.8%, similar to Finland (3.6%) and the Netherlands (3.9%).
While the mean poverty gap of the single-parent households is greater than the
national poverty gap in all countries except Denmark for some threshold percentages,
the mean amount of social transfers paid to single-parent households is smaller than
the overall mean for several countries, for Greece and Slovakia by the widest margin.
However, in countries with greater proportion of single-parent households, the mean
amount of social transfers paid to them exceeds the overall mean. These countries
include not only all the countries in northern and western Europe, but also the Czech
Republic, and Latvia by a narrow margin.
Figure 6 displays the absolute and relative reduction of the poverty gap as func-
tions of the threshold percentage for single-parent households. The greatest absolute
reduction is attained by the UK, followed by Ireland and Norway. The East European
and Mediterranean countries tend to have smaller reductions. A careful interpretation
of these di®erences is called for because of the interplay of the e®ectiveness of the social
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Figure 6: The absolute and relative reduction of the mean poverty gap among the
single-parent households in the countries in EU-SILC.
the median eHI in the country. The relative reduction curves in the right-hand panel
account for the level of income in the country, but not for the extent of poverty in the
subpopulation. The relative reductions are uniformly the smallest for Greece and Italy,
followed by Spain. Another group of countries, Slovakia, Portugal and the Baltic coun-
tries, can be identi¯ed, with the relative reduction around 60% for the lowest threshold
(40%) and 20{30% for the highest threshold (80%). Although the diagram is bound
to be similar to its counterpart for the entire population in Figure 2, there are some
notable departures. Unlike in Figure 2, the reduction for the Netherlands is about
average for the countries in the north and west of Europe, and the reduction in the UK
is relatively much greater for single-parent households than for the entire population.
In general, the curves in both panels of Figure 6 are coarser than in Figure 2, because







































































































































Figure 7: The mean poverty gap and the mean amount of social transfers paid to
households with two adults and three or more children.
they are based on much smaller samples. We have no explanation for the anomalous
behaviour of the curves for Luxembourg (absolute scale) and Norway (relative scale).
Next we study the social transfers to households with two adults and at least three
children. These subsamples form between 3.9% (Portugal) and 17.4% (Iceland) of the
national samples. Figure 7 summarises the size of the poverty gap as a function of the
poverty threshold and the amounts of social transfers to these subsamples. The mean
poverty gap for these subsamples is smaller than the overall mean for most countries
and for all threshold percentages. Notable exceptions are Norway and Germany, but
the mean poverty gap is smaller for the subsample than overall for part of the range
of the threshold percentages also for Finland and France, although only by a narrow
margin.
In the right-hand panel the mean amounts of social transfers are compared for the
subsample and the entire national sample. The sizes of the symbols are proportional
to the square roots of their proportions in the national samples, but the coe±cient
used is di®erent from that in Figure 5, because large households are much more fre-
quent than single-parent households in several countries (6.5 times in Cyprus). Only
Latvia has more single-parent households (6.2%) than households with three or more
children (4.5%). In all countries, the mean amount of social transfers for a household
20with many children exceeds the national mean, by the smallest margin in Spain and
Slovakia. The clump of indistinguishable symbols in the diagram comprises Austria
(9.5%), Belgium (11.4%), Finland (16.7%), France (14.1%), Sweden (12.7%) and the
UK (8.3%), for which the national mean amounts are 6000{7000 Euro, and the means
for the subsample around 11000 Euro. The pairs of amounts for Ireland and Norway
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Figure 8: The absolute and relative reduction of the mean poverty gap among the
single-parent households in the countries in EU-SILC.
Figure 8 displays the absolute and relative reduction curves for the (two-parent)
households with three or more children. In common with Figure 6, the UK and Ireland
have high absolute reductions, although for high threshold percentages Luxembourg
has the highest reduction. The East European and Mediterranean countries tend to
have small absolute reductions, but so does the Netherlands throughout the range and
21Iceland for the lowest threshold percentages. Spain and Italy, followed by Greece for
threshold percentages of 45{60%, have the smallest relative reductions.
6 Conclusion
Our main objective is to identify how well the social transfers ful¯ll the role of allevi-
ating poverty so following an analysis of the contributions made by the social transfers
to the household income, we de¯ned two characteristics, the potential and the e®ec-
tiveness of the social transfer system. The potential assesses how much of the poverty
(or low eHI) could be removed by an ideal allocation of the funds in the social trans-
fers. The e®ectiveness describes how close the current allocation is to this ideal. We
concluded that the Scandinavian and central European countries are closer and the
countries at the Mediterranean further from this ideal. The amount of social transfers
per capita relative to the median eHI shows that the social transfers are on average very
modest in Greece (8.3% of the median eHI), Hungary (48.9%) and Ireland (47.7%) have
the most generous social transfers. In one hand, the analysis of the potential of the
social transfer systems shows that for the lowest poverty threshold, the potential ex-
ceeds 100% for all the countries. This means that, if allocated with purpose, the social
transfers in these countries could easily raise every households eHI. The social transfers
in Norway, Sweden and Slovenia could raise the minimum to a level even above 80%
of the median eHI. In the other hand, the e®ectiveness of the systems points out that
UK is uniformly the most e®ective, followed by Ireland for almost the entire range of
threshold percentages and Czech Republic for a narrow range around 80%. The lowest
e®ectiveness is attained by Italy for the threshold percentages up to just above 70%, for
Cyprus up to 60%, and for Latvia and Spain for threshold percentages above 70%. We
conclude that in general, for any given value of the potential, the social transfers in the
countries in the north and west of Europe are more e®ective than in the south and in
the three former Soviet republics. The systems in the countries in the central Europe
are about as e®ective as the systems in the Scandinavian countries, but have a smaller
potential. Except for Cyprus, the systems in the southern European (Mediterranean)
countries have a low potential, and all of them have low e®ectiveness.
22The stability of the potential and e®ectiveness across time (years) is left for future
research.
The analyses for subpopulations show some di®erences between the reduction of the
mean poverty gap among single-parent households and households with many children
and the reduction for the entire population. In ¯rst term, the mean poverty gap of the
single-parent households exceeds the overall mean poverty gap in the country with the
only exception of Denmark. In second term, the mean amount of social transfers paid
to single parent-households is smaller than the overall mean for several countries. The
analysis of social transfers to households with two adults and at least three children
shows that the mean poverty gap for the subsample is smaller than the overall mean
for most countries and for all threshold percentages, with the exceptions of Norway
and Germany. In all countries the mean amount of social transfers for a household
with many children exceeds the national mean.
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